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Institutions, Parties, and Health Reform
Institutional arrangements have been identified as among the most important constraints still faced by health reformers in the United States.'o Still, the linkages between institutions and policy outcomes remain quite complex. Recent neoinstitutionalist research, both historical and comparative in nature, has tried to show the actual processes by which institutions have an impact on policy outcomes in the United States and other industrialized countries.' One of the important linkages is the way formal institutions condition the crucial role of political parties in the policy process, particularly since parties serve an intermediary function between state and society in democratic political systems. In this analysis, I emphasize how formal rules led to the emergence of a third, left-wing party in Canada, but not in the United States, and how this third party was able to exert considerable influence in the development of health policy.
Parliamentary government and federalism are the two institutional attributes that stand out in explaining the differences between party systems in Canada and the United States. The first defines the rules of the game of legislative politics in the two countries.12 Both Canada and the United States have single member plurality electoral systems, which usually reinforce two party dominance and reduce the potential for third party representation.'3 However, as cross-national studies of party systems have shown, the electoral system can not fully account for the differences in the number of parties in Canada and the United States.14 While major party "failure" has often led to the emergence of political protest movements in the United States, such movements have not, at least in the twentieth century, been successful in consolidating electoral support." By comparison, several third parties have emerged and persisted at the federal level in Canadian politics. 16 The rules of Canadian parliamentary government offer certain opportunities for third party formation and efficacy that do not exist in the United States. One of these rules is parliamentary party discipline. Major parties in Canada are thus less capable of absorbing dissident factions, groups, and individuals either in or out of parliament. In the United States the broad coalitions represented under major party labels allow them to absorb protest movements more readily, especially given the structural barriers imposed on ballot access and the primary system of candidate selection."1 The presence of third party candidates in the United States has been influential in modifying major party platforms and realigning their political bases, but only rarely have these third parties functioned as autonomous political forces.'8 Moreover, even though third parties in Canada have little immediate chance of forming a government, they can nevertheless influence federal policymaking. As issue "entrepreneurs" they can bring serious alternatives to the policymaking agenda and sustain them in a prominent national forum, the House of Commons. They can also pose a potential electoral threat, particularly if their support is regionally concentrated, and their platforms often serve as lightning rods for voter discontent. Under minority governments they hold the effective balance of power over the government and its policies. In the U.S. Congress, in contrast, third parties have limited potential as an independent political force because of the complex rules of the committee system and control by the two major party caucuses. The representation of ideological dissent is submerged within the broader exigencies of party representation, such as the absorption of labor and the left within the Democratic party.'9 Second, federalism has a significant institutional impact on the party system. The Canadian political system does not include a central institution that can effectively represent regions and provinces at the federal level, such as the U.S. Senate.20 Federal governments in Canada, while sensitive to regional concerns, do not necessarily have balanced representation from all regions in their party caucus or cabinet. Indeed, enduring regionalism has contributed to the rise of third parties and to their viability at both the federal and provincial levels. In the provinces, such parties have often supplanted one or both of the traditional major parties and reorganized the provincial party landscape.2' Because of the more decentralized nature of Canadian federalism, the many policy areas (including health policy) constitutionally considered to be under provincial responsibility, and the influential role of provincial governments in intergovernmental relations, the provinces exercise more independent power than American state governments.2z Thus, the election of third party governments in the provinces can have significant implications for policy innovations.
The expression of regional differences by third parties is much more pronounced in Canada than in the U.S., where it can be channeled through regional blocs within the major parties. Where third parties have come to power at the state level, many used the machinery of existing major parties and usurped major party labels in their state organization. While "radical" state-level third parties, particularly in the American midwest in the first decades of the twentieth century, had some impact on the major parties, their influence was nevertheless limited by the encroachment of the federal government in the area of social policy and the ability of national parties to absorb their protest platforms.23
These two institutional attributes, parliamentary government and a distinctive form of federalism, provide opportunities for the rise of third parties in Canada and enhance their potential influence over the choice and elaboration of policy alternatives. In the case of health policy, the political expression of the left was pivotally important in shaping the divergent paths to health reform in Canada and the United States. The presence of a social democratic third party in Canada spurred universal health insurance to national prominence as a viable alternative in the health reform debate and focused powerful political pressure that led to the passage of legislation. By contrast, the absence of an independent voice for the left in the United States ensured that the agenda for national health reform would be set within the limits of the Democratic party coalition. The multiple veto points where opposition can be expressed in the American political system made it much more difficult to repel opposition to health reform than in Canada and further weakened attempts to achieve universal health insurance in the United States. What explains this parting at the crossroads? This comparative historical analysis has emphasized how divergent policy outputs in the two countries reflected the different institutional attributes of their political systems. The legislative battles over health reform in Canada were clearly influenced by the presence of a social democratic third party whose emergence and influence were shaped by parliamentary rules and by the expression of regional protest through the federal system. The idea of government involvement in health insurance had some support within the major parties in Canada, but successive Liberal governments were obliged to make reactive political decisions influenced by the presence of a social democratic third party in the House of Commons. As an independent voice for the left, the CCF-NDP acted as a policy "entrepreneur" for a universal health insurance alternative that reflected social democratic principles of comprehensive care, equitable access, and public administration. Its ability to shape the parameters of health reform in Canada derived from the potential electoral threat it represented as a regionally based political movement and a release valve for voter discontent, particularly among the working class. The third party also profited from the institutional leverage it could expend within the House of Commons, keeping health reform on the political agenda and helping to facilitate its final passage. In addition, the CCF-NDP's innovations at the provincial level displayed to a wider national audience how government intervention in the health care sector could be successfully implemented. This demonstration effect helped create a momentum toward a consensus around the idea of a universally available system of public health insurance in Canada.
Health Reform in
In the United States, the constraints on third party formation and success channeled demands for health reform through the deeply divided Democratic party. Health reformers necessarily had to strike political compromises. Since labor and the left were effectively captured by the Democratic party, these compromises had to appeal to a broader coalition within the party, including influential southern conservatives who controlled powerful institutional levers in the Congress. In the absence of party discipline, it was difficult to create a coherent campaign for health reform and sustain the necessary support for the passage of national health insurance. In addition, the opponents of health reform, particularly professional groups who perceived concentrated costs related to universal health insurance, were able to take advantage of multiple veto points in the American legislative system. The comparative analysis shows that it is difficult to evaluate the impact of federalism without taking into account other political actors and institutions. In the United States there were few state-level initiatives in health insurance and few instances of social democratic state or local governments during this period. With regional agrarian movements and the left captured by major parties and social policy secured by the federal government, states were not under the same pressure to undertake bold innovations. The institutional features that hindered the formation of coherent policy at the national level were also present in each of the fifty states. The tendency in American federalism for regions to express their interests in the national political arena also worked against universal health insurance, as the southern Democrats demonstrated so effectively in congressional politics. Federalism seems to have had a more amenable influence on the expansion of national health insurance in Canada. Although jurisdictional conflicts checked federal interference in the health area, provincial pressure eventually prodded federal involvement in hospital insurance. In addition, provincial innovations became constructive models for federal participation. The Saskatchewan experiments established the principles of universal health insurance, tested the limits of reform opponents, and ultimately demonstrated the success and shortcomings of such programs.
In the Canadian parliamentary system the executive had greater leverage over health legislation, but in both Canada and the United States political leaders were influenced by partisan politics. Democratic administrations were forced to compromise with the right, while Liberal governments were pulled increasingly by the left. Legislators enjoyed different types of flexibility that allowed them to shape health reform. In the Canadian system third party representatives had considerable exposure in national politics, while government caucus members could rouse their leaders from complacency. At the same time, however, party discipline assured the passage of legislation without the divisive infighting and the pervasive influence of outside groups that characterized the American political system.
Institutions also had an impact on organized labor. Both the Canadian and American labor movements supported a national program of universal health insurance. The crucial difference was their ability to translate this goal into actual legislation. Their ability was conditioned by the nature of labor's political alliances in the party system and the boundaries imposed on political action. Given the structural constraints facing an independent labor-based third party in the American political system, organized labor was forced into the Democratic party coalition, which included not only labor and health reform allies but also the conservative coalition and its allies. In the U.S. organized labor was forced to retreat from national health insurance to a politically feasible alternative in order to overcome Congressional resistance and AMA opposition and recapture the public agenda on health reform. The presence of a social democratic third party was crucial for the labor movement in Canada. Although the CCF-NDP never came to power (or had cabinet representation) at the federal level and thus does not correspond exactly to the social democratic model described by the literature on the welfare state, the presence of a third party of the left nevertheless gave Canadian labor significant leverage in health reform. To summarize, this article has argued that Canada and the United States parted at the crossroads of health reform due to their different institutional configurations and, more precisely, the way these configurations shaped partisan politics in the two countries. The establishment of the public sector in health insurance in Canada and the United States has also had lasting effects on future reform. Universal health insurance in Canada has been institutionalized in a long process of change and experimentation, accomplished through a series of leaps in the dark by provincial innovations and then bolstered and extended through federal involvement. The favorable public consensus that now exists about the role of government in the health care system was built up over time as a result of the success of the public sector in assuring the basic health needs of Canadians. While confrontation between government and medical interests persists, these disputes have not yet called into question the fundamental precepts of government-financed health care. This consensus has remained viable not simply because the system is perceived as successful, but also because it is difficult to challenge such a consensus in the Canadian political system. Despite a decade of Conservative government in Canada and increasing fiscal pressures on the provinces, changes in the fundamental principles underlying universal health insurance have been limited by the extent to which this consensus has become "embedded" in the Canadian political culture.
Such a consensus has yet to be realized in the United States. The limited programs of the 1960s, based on social security precedents, reflect the tendency toward compromise inherent in American political institutions and the American party system. These compromises have in turn become embedded in the American health care system and in perceptions of the government's role in health and social reform. The institutionalization of Medicare and Medicaid, while widening the role of government involvement in the health sector, has also set limits on the feasibility of further reform. Health reform continues to be embroiled in political hassles involving powerful interest groups, a divided Democratic party, and the confines of bipartisan compromise. But the recurrent resurfacing of national health insurance on the political agenda indicates that the enduring demand for reform still persists and will continue until a satisfactory compromise on health policy is reached in the United States.
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